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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides evidence on the association between equity-based compensation for outside 
directors and the implied cost of equity capital. Based on the premise that equity-based 
compensation for outside directors better aligns the interests of the directors with those of 
shareholders, we investigate whether the more equity-based compensation is granted to outside 
directors, the lower cost of equity capital firms enjoy. We find a negative relationship between the 
proportion of equity-based compensation to total compensation for outside directors and the cost 
of equity capital. Our findings suggest that equity-based compensation for outside directors, by 
motivating the directors to play their monitoring role more faithfully, reduces agency risks 
resulting in the lower cost of equity capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
irms inherently suffer from agency problems between shareholders and managers due to the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, the agency problems 
can be classified into two separate problems. On one hand, managers have incentives to make 
decisions pursuing their own interests against shareholders’ interests, which results in a moral hazard problem. On 
the other hand, shareholders cannot figure out the true economic value of the firm, which creates an adverse 
selection problem (Ashbaugh et al., 2009b). Since both the problems expose shareholders to a greater agency risk, 
equity investors rationally demand a higher premium for firms with higher agency risk and raise the cost of equity 
capital. 
 
However, firms with effective governance mechanism experience lesser degree of agency problems. Strong 
corporate governance restricts managers’ opportunistic behavior and reduces information asymmetry mitigating 
agency problems. Thus, it is apparent that corporate governance has an influence on the cost of equity capital via 
decreasing agency risk. Ample studies have investigated the kinds of governance attributes which affect the cost of 
equity capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Francis et al., 2004; Attig 
et al., 2008; Ashbaugh et al., 2009a; Ashbaugh et al., 2009b). Among various governance attributes, we focus on 
equity-based compensation for outside directors for two reasons. First, outside directors are important constituents 
of strong corporate governance. The independence of outside directors from managements allows the directors to 
effectively monitor managers’ opportunistic behavior (e.g., Klein, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Second, equity-based 
compensation given to outside directors improves the effectiveness of outside directors in monitoring managerial 
behaviors. Since outside directors are agents of shareholders as well, it is also possible that another type of agency 
problem between outside directors and shareholders exists. Equity-based compensation to outside directors can play 
a crucial role as a remedy for such type agency problem. It motivates outside directors to more rigorously monitor 
the managements of their firm by better aligning the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. 
Consequently, improved corporate governance decreases agency risk and cost of equity capital. 
 
In this study, we examine the relationship between the amount of equity-based compensation granted to 
outside directors and cost of equity capital. Using six specific measures and two composite measures of the cost of 
equity capital, we find that the proportion of equity-based compensation to total compensation is negatively 
F 
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associated with the cost of equity capital. To test the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of equity-based 
compensation amount, we use the average amount of equity-based compensation (equity amount), and also separate 
the amount of stock compensation and that of options. However, the relationship between equity-based 
compensation and the cost of equity capital is unaffected. Our results suggest that providing equity-based 
compensation to outside directors can constitute an effective governance mechanism which better aligns the interests 
between shareholders and outside directors. The results also imply that firms with stronger corporate governance 
enjoy lower cost of equity capital. 
 
Our findings contribute to the extant studies in two ways. First, we provide a link between the 
compensation structure of outside directors and the cost of equity capital. We believe this evidence is meaningful 
because the cost of equity capital is one of the most frequently treated issues in academia, and equity-based 
compensation is recently attracting much more attention from accounting and finance researchers. Second, this study 
complements the prior literature that investigates the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity 
capital. Rather than exploring the effect of general characteristics of outside directors on cost of equity capital, we 
extend their work by presenting evidence that a specific compensation scheme for outside directors affects cost of 
equity capital. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related research and the hypotheses are discussed 
in Section 2. In Section 3, I describe the sample and the research design. Section 4 presents the results, and I 
summarize the findings and conclude this study in Section 5. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND PREDICTIONS 
 
Shareholders delegate their decision rights and oversight roles to a board of directors to prevent the agency 
problems by managements. Previous studies have shown that board characteristics, such as the composition of a 
board and board meeting frequency, are related to the effectiveness of the board and thus to strong corporate 
governance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Vafeas, 1999; Carcello et al., 2006). Going one step forward, many researchers 
turned their eyes to the types of directors, especially outside directors. Outside directors are considered to be 
independent in that they are not employees of the company and unaffiliated with it. The independence of outside 
directors from management enables them to effectively monitor CEO’s opportunistic behavior against shareholders. 
Empirical literature documents that outside directors help firms build a solid corporate governance system and 
thereby reduce agency costs by restricting managers’ opportunistic behaviors and decreasing information asymmetry. 
Klein (2002) documents that board independence, proxied by the percentage of outside directors in a board, is 
negatively associated with the extent to which firms manipulate their earnings. Ajinkya et al. (2005) also find that 
firms with more outside directors tend to issue more specific, accurate and less optimistically biased management 
forecast. 
 
However, while outside directors can be the source of strong corporate governance, they can also generate 
another type of agency problems. For example, outside directors might collude with managers and engage in 
opportunistic activities pursing their own interests even though the decision ruins the shareholders’ wealth (e.g., 
Brick et al., 2006). As CEOs frequently sits on the nomination committee or exerts influence on the nomination 
process of outside directors, they might take advantage of the relationship to force outside directors to be on their 
side (Perry, 2000). Even worse, it is difficult for shareholders to directly monitor and control the behavior of outside 
directors. The board generally involves in setting its own compensation and deciding upon its own members’ 
continuation of directorship through remuneration committee and nomination committee (Yermack, 2004). In 
addition, the performance of outside directors is evaluated by other board members and hard to quantify. Therefore, 
the performance evaluation of outside directors is subject to the discretion of other board members. 
 
In the dearth of a direct mechanism for controlling the behavior of outside directors, equity-based 
compensation to outside directors can be a fundamental remedy for the agency problem between shareholders and 
outside directors. By allowing the interests of outside directors to be better aligned with those of shareholders, 
equity-based compensation incentivizes the directors to more faithfully fulfill their monitoring role on behalf of 
shareholders. Empirical studies provide evidence on the incentivizing role of equity-based compensation in 
alleviating agency problems caused by outside directors. Perry (2000) argues that CEOs will be more likely to get 
fired following bad performance when the outside directors are highly compensated with equity. Ryan and Wiggins 
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(2004) suggest a positive association between corporate governance and equity-based compensation for outside 
directors. That is, firms with strong boards compensate the directors with more equity-based compensation to align 
their objectives more closely with shareholders’. In addition, Linn and Park (2005) point out firms with more 
investment opportunities grant larger amounts of equity-based compensation to outside directors. Deutsch (2007) 
emphasizes that equity-based compensation for outside directors enhances firms’ R&D investment. Fich and 
Shivdasani (2005) state that equity-based compensation helps align the incentives of outside directors and 
shareholders, thereby improving firm value. Likewise, Cordeiro et al. (2005) demonstrate that the equity-based 
compensation for directors is positively associated with future firm performance. 
 
Another stream of research explores the relation between agency risk and the cost of equity capital. For 
example, Attig et al. (2008) assert a negative association between institutional ownership and cost of equity capital. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2009b) find firms with more independent directors and more board ownership are exposed to less 
agency risk, so they have a lower cost of equity capital. Botosan (1997), and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) prove a 
negative relation between and disclosure quality and cost of equity capital. Francis et al. (2004) document that 
earnings transparency is negatively associated with cost of equity capital. Similarly, Hail and Leuz (2006) and 
Ashbaugh et al. (2009a) point out firms with a more extensive regulation environment have a lower cost of equity 
capital by reducing agency risks. Aggregately, empirical evidence supports the negative association between agency 
risk and the cost of equity capital. 
 
In conclusion, by tying the interests of outside directors to those of shareholders, equity-based 
compensation granted to outside directors curtails the possibility of agency problems caused by outside directors as 
well as managers. The interest alignment allows firms to suffer from lesser degree of agency risk and thereby 
reduces the firms’ cost of equity capital. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that the amount of equity-based 
compensation awarded to outside directors is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
Our sample consists of firms from Compustat, Corporate Library, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases for the 
years extending from year 2006 to 2008. Compustat (ExecuComp) provides annual compensation data for each 
outside director after 2006 as well as other financial data. Directors are classified from Corporate Library as one of 
the following: inside, gray, or outside.
1
 To fill in the data missing in the Corporate Library database, we hand-
collect additional director type information from the proxy statements. We obtain the stock price information from 
the CRSP database. To compute implied cost of equity capital, earnings forecasts are acquired from the I/B/E/S 
database. We use median analysts’ forecasts of EPS at year t+1 and at year t+2 (EPSit+1 and EPSit+2), respectively.
2
 
We also find analysts’ estimation of EPS long-term growth rate (ltg). If EPSit+2 is not available, then we infer 
EPSit+2 with EPSit+1 and ltg. After all variables are taken together, the final sample for the empirical analysis 
comprises 2,727 firm-year observations from the intersection of the Compustat, Corporate Library, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S databases.
3
 
 
3.2 Measures of Cost of Equity Capital 
 
In this section, we give a short explanation of the eight measures of implied cost of equity capital that we 
calculated (COE). Following the extant literature, we use the models to measure implied cost of equity capital based 
on either the dividend discount model or the residual income model. In detail, we estimate six types of specifications 
and two types of composite measures to increase the validity and the credibility of the proxies. The first measure of 
cost of equity capital is R_PE, which reflects expected cum-dividend combination earnings for the subsequent two 
                                                 
1 An inside director holds a director position in a firm and is also an employee of the firm at the same time. A gray director holds a director 
position in a firm and has a special relationship with the CEO. Since a gray director is usually a former employee, current commercial partner or 
family member of the CEO, he (she) may be easily influenced by the CEO. A director who does not satisfy either of these descriptions is called 
an independent outside director, and he (she) is independent of the CEO. We only consider independent directors in our analyses. We arrive at 
similar results when we include gray directors in our analyses. 
2 Mean value of analysts’ forecasts shows similar results. 
3 To handle outlier problems, we winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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years. It is the inverse of the forward price-earnings ratio. We consider R_PE as a basic benchmark of implied cost 
of equity capital. 
 
The next three measures are based on the dividend discount model (e.g., Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; 
Easton, 2004; Easton & Monahan, 2005). These measures use exactly the same model but differ in assumptions on 
dividend and earnings growth patterns. 
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In this equation, Pit is stock price at the year-end, EPSit+τ (DPSit+τ) is a forecasted EPS (DPS) of year t + τ at 
year t and growth is the expected growth rate of earnings. From this equation, we derive (1) R_PEG under the no 
dividend and zero growth rate assumptions (DPSit+1 = 0, growth = 0), (2) R_MPEG under the zero growth rate 
assumption (growth = 0), and (3) R_OJN by setting the growth rate to analysts’ long-term growth rate (growth = ltg). 
 
The other two measures are based on the residual income valuation model. These two values are from the 
same valuation model but are different in assuming the terminal horizon and future growth rates. In evaluating cost 
of equity capital, R_CT, we assume that earnings will expand at a rate of analysts’ consensus (ltg) until year t + 5 
and be constant thereafter.
4
 R_GLS is from Gebhardt et al. (2001). In this model, ROE is presumed to decline at a 
certain rate from year t + 3 to year t + 12 and then will be uniform forever.
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ROEit+τ = EPSit + τ/BPSit + τ-1 for τ = 1, 2. 
ROEit+ τ = ROEit + τ-1 – fade for τ > 2. fade = 
(ROEit + τ-2 – HIROEt)/10, HIROEt is the 
industry median ROE from year t-4 to year t. 
BPSit+τ = BPSit+τ-1*(1+ ROEit+τ*(1-K)). K = 
max(0, min(DPSit/EPSit, 1)) for profitable 
firms. K = max(0, min(DPSit/(0.06*BPSit), 1)) 
for loss firms. 
 
The last two measures are R_AVG1 and R_AVG2. Because all six measures might have errors in gauging 
cost of equity capital, we aggregate these together to reduce possible measurement error caused from each model. 
R_AVG1 is the average value of six measures; (R_PE + R_PEG + R_MPEG + R_OJN + R_CT + R_GLS)/6. 
                                                 
4 Following Claus and Thomas (2001), we also presume that the earnings will grow at an inflation rate (US 10-year bond yield – 3 percent) or at 
a rate of analysts’ consensus (ltg). We find similar results. 
5 In Gebhardt et al. (2001), they assume ROE will diminish at the same rate toward the industry median ROE from year t + 3 to year t + 12. 
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R_AVG2 is the average value of four measures excluding maximum and minimum value from the six measures; 
(R_PE + R_PEG + R_MPEG + R_OJN + R_CT + R_GLS – max [R_PE, R_PEG, R_MPEG, R_OJN, R_CT, R_GLS] 
– min [R_PE, R_PEG, R_MPEG, R_OJN, R_CT, R_GLS])/4. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
 
We use the following OLS regression model (with the detailed subscripts omitted). 
 
COE = β0 + β1DIR_COMP + β2CEO_COMP + β3CEO/CHAIR + β4OUTSIDE + β5PROBLEM + β6BOARDSIZE + 
β7TOPOWN + β8STDRET + β9DISPERS + β10BETA + β11MOM + β12SIZE + β13MB + ε 
 
The independent variable DIR_COMP indicates equity-based compensation paid to the outside directors. It 
is the ratio of total equity-based compensation for all outside directors over total compensation (cash and equity, etc.) 
for all outside directors (i.e., total equity-based compensation divided by total compensation). Since equity 
compensation for outside directors will tie the interests of directors and shareholders together, a higher proportion of 
equity compensation for outside directors will result in a lower level of cost of equity capital. So, we expect β1 to be 
negative. CEO_COMP represents equity-based compensation for the CEO, which is similarly defined as 
DIR_COMP. According to the prior literature, managers’ behavior varies. Sometimes, managers will care more 
about the shareholders due to an alignment of interests (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003), but sometimes, managers will be 
less care about the shareholders. Rather they only focus on creating their own benefits, for example, right before the 
stock option grants date (e.g., Aboody & Kasznik, 2000). Thus, we do not make any expectations on β2. Following 
previous studies, we include the other control and firm characteristic variables (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2006; Attig et al., 
2008; Ashbaugh et al., 2009a; Ashbaugh et al., 2009b). 
 
CEO/CHAIR, OUTSIDE, PROBLEM, BOARDSIZE, and TOPOWN are corporate governance related 
variables. CEO/CHAIR implies CEO and chairman duality. It is 1 if a CEO is also a chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise. The dual position of CEO and Chairman usually weakens corporate governance since board members’ 
monitoring activities will be restricted by the CEO. We expect β3 to be positive. OUTSIDE is the proportion of 
outside directors on the board. More outside directors intensify the corporate governance, and we anticipate negative 
coefficients on β4 (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2009a; Ashbaugh et al., 2009b). PROBLEM indicates whether there is a 
director who failed to meet the attendance standards.
6
 It equals 1 if there is at least one director who violates the 
standards and 0 otherwise. An attendance problem can be interpreted as weak governance. Therefore, we expect a 
positive value of β5. BOARDSIZE is the number of directors in the board. It is controversial since a larger board is 
sometimes efficient but sometimes not. In some cases, a larger board is more efficient since there are more directors 
to oversee managers with more knowledge and a better background, but in other cases, it is inefficient since there 
are coordination problem among the directors (e.g., Yermack, 1996). Therefore, we do not predict any directions on 
β6. TOPOWN is the percentage of total shares held by the top five executives to total outstanding shares. Managers 
who possess larger shares are inclined to defend the shareholders’ interests. Warfield et al. (1995) report that as 
management ownership gets larger, earnings will be more informative and discretionary accruals will be smaller. 
The results clarify that management pursues value-maximizing actions. So, we predict negative coefficients on β7. 
 
Furthermore, we include other variables. STDRET is standard deviation of daily stock returns for the past 
24 months (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2006; Attig et al., 2008), DISPERS is the standard deviation of all forecasts made by 
analysts divided by median analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Attig et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008), BETA measures 
systematic risk suggested by the Capital Market Asset Pricing Model (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2006; Ashbaugh et al., 
2009a; Chen et al., 2009). MOM captures stock price momentum (e.g., Hope et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2009), which 
is defined the stock return during the previous 12 months. SIZE is the log of market value of equity at the beginning 
of the year, and MB is the market-to-book value of the equity ratio (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2006; Attig et al., 2008; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2009a). 
 
Shareholders will require less risk premium when the firm is less risky. That is, when the market is less 
volatile (STDRET, DISPERS). We expect positive coefficients on β8 and β9. A higher BETA implies a higher 
systematic risk. Therefore, we anticipate positive coefficients on β10 since investors require higher cost of equity 
                                                 
6 The required attendance rate is 75% or more. 
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capital for higher BETA firms based on Capital Market Asset Pricing Model. According to Guay et al. (2005), 
previous stock returns might be higher (lower) due to the delayed recognition of bad (good) news. In this case, the 
value of implied cost of equity capital tends to have downward (upward) bias. So, prior literature reports negative 
coefficients on stock return momentum (MOM). We also expect β11 to be negative. Finally, we control SIZE and MB. 
We anticipate negative β12 since SIZE is negatively associated with cost of equity as a proxy for liquidity. In other 
words, investors require lower risk premium for more liquid stocks. The MB ratio, sometimes infers a distress factor, 
which is inclined to have a lower value (i.e., lower MB ratio) for a financially distressed firm. Investors require 
higher risk premium, i.e. cost of equity capital (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2006; Attig et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008) for 
distressed firms. Thus, we predict positive coefficients on β13. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In Table 2 and Table 3, we introduce the descriptive statistics on key variables. Our sample has 2,727 firm-
year level observations ranging from year 2006 to 2008. In Table 2, we report the distribution of implied cost of 
equity capital based on eight different methods. Mean (median) values vary between 0.0663 (0.0637) and 0.1139 
(0.1044). R_OJN is the highest and R_PE is the lowest mean (median) value. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics on Cost of Equity Capital 
 
# of obs. Mean Median Stdev. 1% 25% 75% 99% 
R_PE 2,727 0.0663 0.0637 0.0285 0.0079 0.0253 0.0637 0.1179 
R_PEG 2,727 0.1048 0.0937 0.0503 0.0252 0.0451 0.0937 0.2027 
R_MPEG 2,727 0.1123 0.0996 0.0521 0.0324 0.0521 0.0996 0.2113 
R_OJN 2,727 0.1139 0.1044 0.0995 0.0000 0.0010 0.1044 0.2884 
R_CT 2,727 0.0845 0.0798 0.0299 0.0312 0.0465 0.0798 0.1374 
R_GLS 2,727 0.1073 0.0977 0.0571 0.0165 0.0392 0.0977 0.2075 
R_AVG1 2,727 0.0987 0.0910 0.0378 0.0404 0.0533 0.0910 0.1756 
R_AVG2 2,727 0.0970 0.0898 0.0362 0.0391 0.0544 0.0898 0.1698 
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics on Independent and Control Variables 
 
# of obs. Mean Median Stdev. 25% 75% 
Independent Variables  
     
DIR_COMP 2,727 0.5257 0.5357 0.2132 0.4183 0.6686 
DIR_RAMT ($1,000) 2,727 94 75 94 39 122 
Control Variables 
 
     
CEO_COMP 2,727 0.6463 0.7301 0.2528 0.5419 0.8262 
CEO_RAMT ($1,000) 2,727 4,105 2,404 5,762 901 5,226 
CEO/CHAIR 2,727 0.6464 1.0000 0.4781 0.0000 1.0000 
OUTSIDE 2,727 0.7620 0.7777 0.1232 0.6923 0.8666 
PROBLEM 2,727 0.0722 0 0.2589 0 0 
BOARDSIZE 2,727 9.1840 9 2.1399 8 11 
TOPOWN (%) 2,727 2.9203 0.6804 6.9597 0.2390 2.0045 
INST_OWN (%) 2,727 79.1956 81.9033 18.1474 70.3199 92.6779 
STDRET 2,727 0.0894 0.0833 0.0375 0.0611 0.1115 
DISPERS 2,727 0.1146 0.0612 0.1742 0.0329 0.1207 
BETA 2,727 1.1656 1.0670 0.6579 0.6958 1.5111 
MOM 2,727 0.0225 0.0044 0.3724 -0.2221 0.2174 
SIZE 2,727 21.5836 21.4264 1.5042 20.4699 22.5504 
MB 2,727 3.0126 2.3058 2.6253 1.5652 3.5595 
DIR_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for outside directors over total compensation for outside directors in a firm during the fiscal year 
(i.e. total equity-based incentives / total incentives); DIR_RAMT = average amount of equity-based incentives to each director in a firm during the fiscal 
year; CEO_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for CEO over total compensation for CEO; CEO_RAMT = total amount of equity-based 
incentives for CEO in a firm during the fiscal year; CEO/CHAIR = 1 if the CEO also holds chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; OUTSIDE = total 
number of independent outside directors over total number of directors; PROBLEM = 1 if there is a director attendance problem (for each director, 
attendance rate should be above 75%), and 0 otherwise; BOARDSIZE = total number of directors in a board; TOPOWN = the percentage of total shares 
held by top five executives to total outstanding shares; STDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns for the previous 24 months; DISPERS = the 
standard deviation of all forecasts made by analysts divided by median analysts’ forecasts; BETA = estimates from Capital Market Asset Pricing Model; 
MOM = stock return during the previous 12 months; SIZE = log of market value of equity at the beginning of year; MB = market-to-book value of equity 
ratio. 
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of independent and control variables. On average, outside directors in a 
firm receive approximately 53% of their total compensation in stock and/or options. In dollar terms, each outside 
director is granted $94,000 of equity-based compensation on average. On the other hand, CEOs are rewarded with 
much more stock and/or options than outside directors. They receive 65% of total their compensation, approximately 
$4.1 million in US dollars, as equity-based compensation. The mean value of CEO/CHAIR (0.6464) implies that 
CEOs of 65% of firm-year observations hold a chairman position at the same time in the sample. Among the board 
of directors, 76% are outside members. There are only a few attendance problems in our sample (mean of 
PROBLEM: 0.0722). There are approximately 9 members on average. The top five managers hold 2.92% of shares 
of the firm. 
 
4.2 Results for Difference in Mean (Median) Tests 
 
Table 4 provides the results for difference in mean (median) tests. We divide the sample into two different 
groups based on the median of DIR_COMP. High (Low) DIR_COMP consists of above (below)-median 
DIR_COMP observations. We examine whether there is a difference between these two groups. We only report the 
variables related to the cost of equity capital, CEO compensation (CEO_COMP) and corporate governance 
(CEO/CHAIR, OUTSIDE, PROBLEM, BOARDSIZE and TOPOWN). 
 
The results explain that there is a significant difference in the cost of equity capital between the groups. 
Among the eight different specifications, six confirm that higher equity compensation groups have a lower level of 
the cost of equity capital (except R_OJN and R_GLS), which is generally consistent with our prediction. Moreover, 
these also infer that there are significant differences in CEO_COMP, BOARDSIZE, and TOPOWN. We find that 
higher proportion groups grant more equity compensation to CEOs (CEO_COMP) as Brick et al. (2006) explained. 
These groups also have a small board size (BOARDSIZE) and possess lower top management ownership (TOPOWN) 
as prior literature described.
7
 
 
Table 4:  Difference in Mean (Median) Tests 
 
High DIR_COMP 
(N = 1,364) 
Low DIR_COMP 
(N = 1,363) 
High – Low 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
R_PE 0.0596 0.0576 0.0642 0.0608 -0.0047*** -0.0032*** 
R_PEG 0.1006 0.0927 0.1050 0.0945 -0.0044*** -0.0018*** 
R_MPEG 0.1008 0.0928 0.1052 0.0945 -0.0044*** -0.0017*** 
R_OJN 0.1148 0.1065 0.1124 0.1047 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 
R_CT 0.0757 0.0734 0.0791 0.0761 -0.0033*** -0.0027*** 
R_GLS 0.1099 0.0934 0.1125 0.0950 -0.0026*** -0.0016*** 
R_AVG1 0.0938 0.0875 0.0967 0.0897 -0.0029*** -0.0023*** 
R_AVG2 0.0904 0.0831 0.0940 0.0872 -0.0036*** -0.0041*** 
CEO_COMP 0.6860 0.7684 0.6342 0.7135 0.0520*** 0.0549*** 
CEO/CHAIR 0.5669 1.0000 0.5544 1.0000 0.0130*** 0.0000*** 
OUTSIDE 0.7447 0.7500 0.7356 0.7500 0.0090*** 0.0000*** 
PROBLEM 0.0898 0.0000 0.0827 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0000*** 
BOARDSIZE 9.1258 9.0000 9.6523 9.0000 -0.5265*** 0.0000*** 
TOPOWN 2.3757 0.6931 3.2022 0.7693 -0.8265*** -0.0761*** 
CEO_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for CEO over total compensation for CEO; CEO/CHAIR = 1 if the CEO also holds 
chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; OUTSIDE = total number of independent outside directors over total number of directors; PROBLEM = 
1 if there is a director attendance problem (for each director, attendance rate should be above 75%), and 0 otherwise; BOARDSIZE = total number 
of directors in a board; TOPOWN = the percentage of total shares held by top five executives to total outstanding shares; t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance of parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Many studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Yermack, 1996; Nagar et al., 2003; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2008) suggest that characteristics of strong corporate governance are negatively associated with board size and management ownership. 
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4.3 Results for Multivariate Tests 
 
Table 5 contains the impact of the proportion of equity-based compensation for outside directors on cost of 
equity capital. The results are based on the OLS regressions. We’re especially interested in DIR_COMP.8 
 
From column 1 to column 6, the results show that the estimated coefficients of DIR_COMP are negative and 
statistically significant. These results support our conjecture that firms with higher equity-based compensation for 
outside directors have a lower cost of equity capital. Among the six coefficients of CEO_COMP, three coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant and we think these results might suggest that shareholders recognize CEOs’ 
opportunistic behavior (e.g., Aboody & Kasznik, 2000), so shareholders require a higher cost of equity capital. 
OUTSIDE have positive coefficients differing from our prediction. BOARDSIZE confirms the idea that a small board is 
more efficient in monitoring (e.g., Yermack, 1996). TOPOWN has negative coefficients and this is evidence of interest 
alignment between managers and shareholders. 
 
Higher values of STDRET and/or DISPERS suggest that the market is highly volatile. Shareholders naturally 
require a higher risk premium for highly volatile firms. Positive coefficients on STDRET and DISPERS clarify this 
explanation. The coefficients of SIZE alternate, but most of them support our expectation. SIZE has negative 
coefficients, which show that larger firms are more liquid in trading. MB consistently has negative coefficients as firms 
with lower MB ratio are highly distressed. 
 
Furthermore, when we use two composite measures to improve soundness of the proxies, we find consistent 
results. The estimated coefficients of DIR_COMP are negative and significant. In addition to that, coefficients of the 
other variables replicate previous results. Coefficients of CEO_COMP and BOARDSIZE are positive and significant. 
TOPOWN has a negative coefficient, and the other variables present similar results (results unreported). 
 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Alternative Measure of Equity-Based Compensation 
 
For the sensitivity tests, we apply an additional measure of equity-based compensation for outside directors. 
Alternatively, we define equity-based compensation for outside directors as the dollar amount of the equity-based 
compensation awarded to outside directors (DIR_AMT). DIR_AMT is calculated as the average equity-based 
compensation for each outside director. The regression results generally reveal that DIR_AMT and the implied cost 
of equity capital have a negative and statistically significant association (results unreported). Even if the coefficients 
are not all significant, at least the directions are consistent with our expectations (In R_PE model and R_CT model, 
the coefficients are negatively significant at the 0.01 level). The overall results suggest that larger amounts of equity-
based compensation for outside directors strengthen the monitoring role of outside directors and reduce agency risk. 
 
5.2 Separate Effects of Stock and Option Awards for Directors on the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
Different types of equity-based compensation may affect the implied cost of equity capital in different ways. 
Problematically, one particular type of equity-based compensation may be driving the results. In addition, outside 
directors may be sensitive to whether their equity-based compensation is in the form of stock or options. Hence, we 
conduct further analysis separating the two types of equity-based compensation. The results shown in Table 7 reveal 
that option-based compensation for outside directors significantly lowers the cost of equity capital. The reason is 
that only options exhibit a statistically significant effect, which is consistent with Bryan et al. (2000), who suggest 
that stock options are more efficient than stock grants in motivating outside directors because the payoffs from stock 
options are convex. In sum, the results suggest that option-based compensation for outside directors reduces the cost 
of equity capital. 
 
                                                 
8 For the sensitivity tests, we alternatively adopt various specifications of DIR_COMP. We use the average amount of equity compensation for 
outside directors, and we also separate stock and options and measure the proportion of stock and options, respectively. The results are 
statistically similar and will be shown later. 
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Table 5:  The Impact of the Proportion of Equity-Based Compensation for Outside Directors on Cost of Equity Capital 
 
(Column 1) 
R_PE 
(Column 2) 
R_PEG 
(Column 3) 
R_MPEG 
(Column 4) 
R_OJN 
(Column 5) 
R_CT 
(Column 6) 
R_GLS 
Intercept 0.0289 (2.72)*** 0.0661 (3.74)*** 0.0679 (3.83)*** 0.0559 (1.62) 0.0225 (2.23)** 0.0077 (0.23) 
DIR_COMP -0.0080 (-3.00)*** -0.0093 (-2.07)** -0.0090 (-2.01)** 0.0062 (0.71) -0.0073 (-2.87)*** -0.0099 (-1.20) 
CEO_COMP 0.0082 (3.52)*** 0.0043 (1.10) 0.0041 (1.04) -0.0006 (-0.08) 0.0072 (3.26)*** 0.0139 (1.93)* 
CEO/CHAIR -0.0005 (-0.42) -0.0007 (-0.40) -0.0007 (-0.39) -0.0047 (1.32) 0.0004 (0.38) 0.0002 (0.06) 
OUTSIDE 0.0083 (1.98)** 0.0214 (3.04)*** 0.0214 (3.04)*** 0.0445 (3.25)*** 0.0101 (2.53)** 0.0196 (1.51) 
PROBLEM -0.0015 (-0.81) -0.0037 (-1.18) -0.0037 (-1.17) -0.0079 (-1.28) -0.0013 (-0.72) 0.0072 (1.23) 
BOARDSIZE 0.0009 (3.36)*** 0.0015 (.22)*** 0.0015 (3.22)*** 0.0016 (1.74)* 0.0009 (3.58)*** 0.0027 (3.12)*** 
TOPOWN -0.0001 (-1.44) -0.0001 (0.41) -0.0001 (-0.41) 0.0005 (1.57) -0.0002 (-1.83)* -0.0010 (-3.23)*** 
STDRET 0.0039 (0.20) 0.2687 (8.21)*** 0.2665 (8.12)*** 0.4767 (7.44)*** 0.0806 (4.32)*** 0.4239 (6.98)*** 
DISPERS -0.0006 (-1.11) 0.0039 (4.29)*** 0.0039 (4.28)*** 0.0069 (3.86)*** 0.0002 (0.32) 0.0042 (2.45)** 
BETA 0.0058 (5.04)*** 0.0217 (11.35)*** 0.0217 (11.33)*** 0.0264 (7.07)*** 0.0104 (9.53)*** 0.0198 (5.60)*** 
MOM -0.0217 (-14.65)*** -0.0478 (-19.28)*** -0.0479 (-19.27)*** -0.0444 (-9.15)*** -0.0262 (-18.51)*** -0.0137 (-2.98)*** 
SIZE 0.0006 (1.26) -0.0015 (-1.80)* -0.0016 (-1.89)* -0.0026 (-1.65)* 0.0010 (2.19)** 0.0000 (0.01) 
MB -0.0004 (-3.14)*** -0.0007 (-3.48)*** -0.0007 (-3.48)*** -0.0003 (-0.64) -0.0003 (-2.56)** 0.0014 (3.90)*** 
# of obs. 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 
Adjusted R2 0.1247 0.2380 0.2373 0.1167 0.1027 0.0664 
DIR_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for outside directors over total compensation for outside directors in a firm during the fiscal year (i.e. total equity-based incentives / total 
incentives); CEO_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for CEO over total compensation for CEO; CEO/CHAIR = 1 if the CEO also holds chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; 
OUTSIDE = total number of independent outside directors over total number of directors; PROBLEM = 1 if there is a director attendance problem (for each director, attendance rate should be above 
75%), and 0 otherwise; BOARDSIZE = total number of directors in a board; TOPOWN = the percentage of total shares held by top five executives to total outstanding shares; STDRET = standard 
deviation of daily stock returns for the previous 24 months; DISPERS = the standard deviation of all forecasts made by analysts divided by median analysts’ forecasts; BETA = estimates from Capital 
Market Asset Pricing Model; MOM = stock return during the previous 12 months; SIZE = log of market value of equity at the beginning of year; MB = market-to-book value of equity ratio; (Asymptotic) 
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance of parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6:  The Impact of the Proportion of Stock and Options for Outside Directors on Cost of Equity Capital 
 
(Column 1) 
R_PE 
(Column 2) 
R_PEG 
(Column 3) 
R_MPEG 
(Column 4) 
R_OJN 
(Column 5) 
R_CT 
(Column 6) 
R_GLS 
Intercept 0.0319 (3.02)*** 0.0696 (3.94)*** 0.0715 (4.04)*** 0.0574 (1.66)* 0.0254 (2.53)** 0.0164 (0.50) 
STOCK -0.0004 (0.13) -0.0004 (-0.08) 0.0000 (0.01) 0.0098 (1.00) 0.0000 (0.01) 0.0118 (1.27) 
OPTION -0.0134 (-4.75)*** -0.0155 (-3.26)*** -0.0153 (-3.22)*** 0.0039 (0.42) -0.0126 (-4.66)*** -0.0257 (-2.93)*** 
CEO_COMP 0.0079 (3.39)*** 0.0039 (1.00) 0.0037 (0.94) -0.0008 (-0.10) 0.0069 (3.12)*** 0.0129 (1.80)* 
CEO/CHAIR -0.0007 (-0.65) -0.0010 (-0.57) -0.0010 (-0.55) -0.0048 (-1.35) 0.0002 (0.15) -0.0005 (-0.16) 
OUTSIDE 0.0052 (1.23) 0.0177 (2.51)** 0.0176 (2.49)** 0.0431 (3.11)*** 0.0071 (1.76)* 0.0106 (0.81) 
PROBLEM -0.0015 (-0.82) -0.0037 (-1.19) -0.0037 (-1.18) -0.0079 (-1.28) -0.0013 (-0.74) 0.0071 (1.23) 
BOARDSIZE 0.0007 (2.46)** 0.0012 (2.58)** 0.0012 (2.57)** 0.0015 (1.60) 0.0007 (2.66)*** 0.0020 (2.28)** 
TOPOWN -0.0001 (-1.41) -0.0001 (-0.39) -0.0001 (-0.39) 0.0005 (1.58) -0.0002 (-1.81)* -0.0010 (-3.22)*** 
STDRET 0.0127 (0.65) 0.2789 (8.51)*** 0.2767 (8.43)*** 0.4803 (7.47)*** 0.0891 (4.79)*** 0.4494 (7.41)*** 
DISPERS -0.0006 (-1.10) 0.0039 (4.31)*** 0.0039 (4.30)*** 0.0069 (3.86)*** 0.0002 (0.34) 0.0042 (2.47)** 
BETA 0.0053 (4.66)*** 0.0211 (11.08)*** 0.0211 (11.05)*** 0.0262 (7.00)*** 0.0099 (9.16)*** 0.0185 (5.24)*** 
MOM -0.0213 (-14.46)*** -0.0473 (-19.13)*** -0.0474 (-19.12)*** -0.0442 (-9.11)*** -0.0258 (-18.34)*** -0.0125 (-2.74)*** 
SIZE 0.0006 (1.33) -0.0015 (-1.77)* -0.0015 (-1.86)* -0.0026 (-1.65)* 0.0010 (2.26)** 0.0001 (0.06) 
MB -0.0004 (-3.09)*** -0.0007 (-3.44)*** -0.0007 (-3.45)*** -0.0003 (-0.63) -0.0003 (-2.51)** 0.0015 (3.99)*** 
# of obs. 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 
Adjusted R2 0.1363 0.2427 0.2421 0.1165 0.2005 0.0770 
STOCK = the ratio of total STOCK compensation for outside directors over total compensation for outside directors in a firm during the fiscal year; OPTION = the ratio of total OPTION compensation 
for outside directors over total compensation for outside directors in a firm during the fiscal year; CEO_COMP = ratio of total equity-based compensation for CEO over total compensation for CEO; 
CEO/CHAIR = 1 if the CEO also holds chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; OUTSIDE = total number of independent outside directors over total number of directors; PROBLEM = 1 if there is a 
director attendance problem (for each director, attendance rate should be above 75%), and 0 otherwise; BOARDSIZE = total number of directors in a board; TOPOWN = the percentage of total shares 
held by top five executives to total outstanding shares; STDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns for the previous 24 months; DISPERS = the standard deviation of all forecasts made by 
analysts divided by median analysts’ forecasts; BETA = estimates from Capital Market Asset Pricing Model; MOM = stock return during the previous 12 months; SIZE = log of market value of equity at 
the beginning of year; MB = market-to-book value of equity ratio; (Asymptotic) t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance of parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between the equity-based compensation for outside directors and 
cost of equity capital. We find that the proportion of equity-based compensation for outside directors is negatively 
associated with the cost of equity capital. These results hold after controlling for general corporate governance 
measures and other control variables that possibly affect the cost of equity capital. The results are also robust to 
additional tests using the amount of the equity-based compensation instead of the proportion, and separating equity-
based compensation for outside directors into stock and options. 
 
Overall, our findings are consistent in showing that the board of directors is interested in reducing the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. By doing so, the cost of equity capital will be mitigated 
by lowering agency risks. This paper also can provide supplementary evidence that the equity-based compensation 
is one possible tool to improve the corporate governance structure. 
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